Abstract. We study idempotents in intensional Martin-Löf type theory, and in particular the question of when and whether they split. We show that in the presence of propositional truncation and Voevodsky's univalence axiom, there exist idempotents that do not split; thus in plain MLTT not all idempotents can be proven to split. On the other hand, assuming only function extensionality, an idempotent can be split if and only if its witness of idempotency satisfies one extra coherence condition. Both proofs are inspired by parallel results of Lurie in higher category theory, showing that ideas from higher category theory and homotopy theory can have applications even in ordinary MLTT.
Introduction
In December 2014 Martín Escardó asked me whether idempotents split in Martin-Löf type theory (mltt). This paper is a long-winded answer.
Usually, an idempotent means a function (necessarily an endofunction) that is equal to its composite with itself, f • f = f . In mltt, using the propositions-as-types methodology, we might naturally take this to mean a function f : X → X, for some type X, together with a witness of idempotency I : x:X (f (f (x)) = f (x)), where "=" denotes the identity type.
(If we assume function extensionality, as we often will, then to give I is equivalent to giving I : f • f = f .)
A splitting of an idempotent f on X consists of functions r : X → A and s : A → X such that r • s = id A and s • r = f . In zfc set theory, an idempotent always has a splitting Now, if we were wondering whether mltt proved some theorem and we had found that the obvious proof of some theorem used a classical axiom such as the law of excluded middle, then it would be natural to seek for counterexamples in nonclassical models (such as topological or realizability models) or disproofs from nonclassical axioms (such as strong Church's thesis or Brouwerian continuity principles). Similarly, having found that the obvious way to split idempotents depends on uip, it is natural to seek counterexamples in models that violate uip or disproofs from axioms that contradict it.
This leads us into the recently discovered realm of Homotopy Type Theory and Univalent Foundations [APW13, Awo12, PW14, Uni13]. Models which violate uip, such as the Hofmann-Streicher groupoid model [HS98] and Voevodsky's simplicial set model [KL12] , tend to be based on the idea that types are homotopy spaces or ∞-groupoids. The principal known axiom that contradicts uip -Voevodsky's univalence axiom -is also based on this idea.
This suggests that when seeking inspiration from classical mathematics, instead of zfc set theory we should look to homotopy theory and ∞-groupoid theory. In these fields, an important role is played by homotopy coherence. When a structure satisfies some property "up to homotopy", for many purposes it is not enough to simply have such a homotopy; often one requires this homotopy to satisfy some natural axiom(s) at the next dimension upand that only up to homotopy, a homotopy that in turn satisfies its own axioms up to even higher homotopy, and so on to infinity.
For instance, instead of a group we may consider an ∞-group (a.k.a. "grouplike A ∞ -space"). This is a space X with a multiplication m : X × X → X that is, among other things, associative but only up to homotopy: for any x, y, z ∈ X instead of m(m(x, y), z) and m(x, m(y, z)) being equal, they are connected by a path depending continuously on x, y, z. These paths are then required to satisfy a further property: for any x, y, z, w ∈ X there is a pentagon that can be built out of these paths, and we require that there be a continuous way to "fill in" that pentagon inside X. From those filled pentagons one can then construct the boundary of a certain polyhedron, which we require to have a continuous filler, and so on. If we stop at any finite stage, we obtain a much more poorly-behaved notion. Now, under the homotopical interpretation of mltt, a witness of idempotency I :
x:X (f (f (x)) = f (x)) corresponds to a homotopy from f • f to f . Thus, from a homotopytheoretic point of view, it is natural to expect that I itself would not be enough to obtain a well-behaved notion of "idempotent" (such as, for instance, one that can be split): we should ask it to satisfy a further property analogous to filling the pentagon, and that filler should itself satisfy a higher axiom up to homotopy, and so on. In the context of ∞-categories, such a definition of fully-coherent idempotent has been given by Lurie in [Lur09, §4.4.5],
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along with proofs that every fully-coherent idempotent splits and every split idempotent is fully-coherent.
Unfortunately, there is a well-known problem with representing such fully-coherent structures in mltt: on the face of it they seem to require a tower of infinitely many terms, each dependent on the previous ones, which is not something that can be defined as a single object in mltt. This is somewhat disheartening for the project of splitting idempotents. However, it's important not to read more into the results of Lurie cited above than they say. They do say that if a function f can be written as s • r where r • s = id, then f admits a "coherent system of idempotence data". They don't say that if f is idempotent with a specified homotopy I, and f splits, then I must itself admit an extension to a coherent system of idempotence data. Therefore:
• Even though a split idempotent automatically gives rise to an infinite system of coherence data, it doesn't follow that in order to construct a splitting we would necessarily need to give an infinite system of coherence. • It's not too hard to give examples of homotopies I that are not coherent, but it's rather less obvious how to give an example of an incoherent idempotent for which there doesn't exist some other homotopy that is coherent. Fortunately, Lurie has already addressed these questions as well (still in the ∞-categorical context). In [Lur14, Warning 1.2.4.8] he gave an example of an incoherent idempotent that does not split, and in [Lur14, Lemma 7.3.5.14] he showed that to construct a splitting, one additional coherence datum suffices. Inspired by these results, we will set out to transfer them to mltt, as follows: (1) Assuming propositional truncation and the univalence axiom, we can adapt Lurie's counterexample to show that a single witness of idempotency I : x:X (f (f (x)) = f (x)) is insufficient to construct a splitting. In fact, our construction is slightly simpler than Lurie's, and involves an object familiar to constructive mathematicians: the Cantor space 2 N . (2) However, under the weaker assumption of function extensionality, we can adapt Lurie's construction to show that if we also have J : x:X (ap f (I(x)) = I(f (x))), then we can construct a splitting. (Here ap f denotes the action of f on witnesses of equality; sometimes it is called resp.) Our construction is actually the dual of Lurie's: we use a limit where he uses a colimit. A colimit would probably also work, but would require further assumptions on type theory for its construction and well-behavedness. Note that the latter positive result does not require the univalence axiom. So although inspired by higher category theory, we obtain a result that should be of interest even in pure intensional mltt.
Based on these results, we propose that, as in higher category theory, the unadorned word idempotent should not be used for the "incoherent" notion that includes only a single witness I. Instead we will call the pair (f, I) a pre-idempotent.
One might think that the triple (f, I, J) ought to deserve the name "idempotent", since although it does not include all the higher coherence data, we have seen that it does suffice to construct a splitting. However, this is not the case. It is true, in the ∞-categorical world, that a splitting induces a fully coherent idempotent in Lurie's sense, and hence so does a triple (f, I, J); but nothing guarantees that the resulting coherent idempotent is an extension of (f, I, J) itself. In fact, we will show in mltt that it is an extension of (f, I), but not in general of J: assuming univalence and propositional truncation, there exist choices for J that are not coherentifiable at all. For these reasons, we will instead call a triple (f, I, J) a quasi-idempotent; it is analogous to the "incoherent, but coherentifiable, equivalences" that in [Uni13] are called quasi-inverses.
At this point we may wonder whether there is any way to define the word "idempotent" in mltt in a way that will translate to the correct notion homotopically. There is one answer that is somewhat "cheap": by [Lur09, Corollary 4.4.5.14], in an ∞-category the space of idempotents on an object X is equivalent to the space of retractions of X, meaning quadruples (A, r, s, H) where r : X → A and s : A → X and H is a homotopy r • s ∼ id A . The latter can be defined in mltt (with universes) as Retr(X) :≡ A:Type r:X→A s:A→X a:A (r(s(a)) = a), and if we assume the univalence axiom, it will have the correct homotopy type. Thus, we could define an idempotent on X to be an inhabitant of this type.
Of course, this would be rather unsatisfying: we expect an "idempotent" to consist of a map f : X → X equipped with some kind of structure, and we expect the construction of its splitting to be a nonvacuous operation. Moreover, it has an actual technical drawback as well: since it involves a sum over a universe Type, it lives in a universe one higher than that of X.
Both of these problems can be solved with the following trick. If we define the type of quasi-idempotents in the expected way:
then the above splitting construction yields a map split : QIdem(X) → Retr(X).
On the other hand, since every retraction induces a coherent idempotent, we have a map uli : Retr(X) → QIdem(X) and these two maps can be shown to exhibit Retr(X) itself as a retract of QIdem(X). Therefore, the composite uli • split is a quasi-idempotent on QIdem(X), and if we construct its splitting as above, we obtain a type equivalent to Retr(X). This splitting type is what we propose as the definition of (fully coherent) idempotent: it has the correct homotopy type; it is by construction an equipping of an endomap with data (indeed, infinitely many data, encoded internally by way of the natural numbers type); and it lies in the same universe as X.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In §2 we recall some notation and terminology from [Uni13] . In §3 we ease into the study of idempotents by considering several hypotheses (due to Martín Escardó) under which pre-idempotents can be split. The next two sections contain the main results: in §4 we give our example of a pre-idempotent that admits no splitting (assuming propositional truncation and the univalence axiom), and in §5 we construct a splitting of any quasi-idempotent (assuming function extensionality).
The remaining sections are concerned with the more technical coherence questions. In §6 we show that split exhibits Retr(X) as a retract of QIdem(X). In §7 we show that this retraction is not an equivalence, and conclude that although the underlying pre-idempotent of a quasi-idempotent can be recovered from its splitting, the coherence datum J cannot in general be. In §8 we complete a proof from §7 that requires a lengthy analysis of some classifying spaces in type theory. Finally, in §9 we define the type of fully-coherent idempotents, and in §10 we conclude with some remaining open problems.
Throughout, we will argue in the informal style of [Uni13] , and we will make use of the basic results from Chapters 1-4 thereof. However, all the main results of this paper have also been formally verified in the proof assistant Coq, using the Homotopy Type Theory library [HoT15] , and are available as part of that library. As of the date of publication, the correspondence between sections of this paper and files in the library is:
Section Library File §3
Idempotents.v The idempotents-paper git tag records this version of the library.
Some notation and terminology
For the most part, we adopt the notation and terminology of [Uni13] . We write x:A B(x) and x:A B(x) for dependent product and sum as usual in mltt, with their non-dependent special cases A → B and A × B. We write the identity type of two elements x, y : A as x = A y, or usually just x = y; its canonical elements are refl x : x = x. We write x ≡ y for a judgmental equality, and a :≡ b if a is currently being defined to equal b.
A type A is called a mere proposition if we have x,y:A (x = y). In other words, isprop(A) := x,y:A (x = y). It is said to be a set, or to satisfy uip (Uniqueness of Identity Proofs), if x,y:A isprop(x = y), or equivalently x:X p:x=x (p = refl x ).
For functions f, g : A → B, we write f ∼ g for the type x:A (f (x) = g(x)), and call it the type of homotopies from f to g. The function extensionality axiom, which we will almost always have available (either by explicit assumption, or as a consequence of some other assumption), says that this type is equivalent (see below) to the identity type f = A→B g.
For types A and B, we write A B for the type of equivalences from A to B. This is defined as f :A→B isequiv(f ), where isequiv(f ) is any one of a number of well-behaved definitions, the first of which was due to Voevodsky; see [Uni13, Chapter 4] for details. The important properties are that isequiv(f ) if and only if g:
(we generally use the "if" direction of this to construct equivalences), and that isequiv(f ) is a mere proposition. There is a canonical map (A = B) → (A B), and Voevodsky's univalence axiom says that this map is itself an equivalence.
The propositional truncation is, when assumed, a rule associating to every type A a type A which is a mere proposition, and a map |−| : A → A , such that any function from A to a mere proposition factors judgmentally through A . In other words, if B is a mere proposition and f : A → B, then there exists g : A → B such that f (a) ≡ g(|a|) for all a : A. We sometimes pronounce A as "merely A", e.g. if we have an element of A B we say that A and B are merely equivalent. Both univalence and propositional truncation imply function extensionality; the former is due to Voevodsky (see e.g. [Uni13, §4.9] ) and the latter to [KECA14, Corollary 8.3] .
With homotopy-theoretic intuition in mind, elements of identity types (i.e. witnesses of equality) are sometimes called paths. For p : x = A y and q : y = A z, we have p q : x = A z (a witness of transitivity) and p −1 : y = A x (a witness of symmetry), defined using the eliminator of the identity type. Similarly, if f : A → B, we have ap f (p) : f (x) = B f (y), and this operation is functorial (up to propositional equality) in two ways:
We will frequently use the fact that homotopies between functions satisfy a naturality property [Uni13, Lemma 2.4.3]. Specifically, given g, h : B → C and L : g ∼ h, for any b 1 , b 2 : B and p :
The other important facts we will use from [Uni13] are the theorems from its Chapter 2 that characterize the identity types of different type formers (sometimes requiring univalence and function extensionality). For instance, the type (
.e. two ordered pairs are equal just when their components are. In most cases these results are reasonably intuitive.
Some pre-idempotents that split
As suggested in the introduction, we define:
A retract of a type X consists of a type A, functions s : A → X and r : X → A, and a homotopy H : r • s ∼ id A . A splitting of an endofunction f : X → X is a retraction (A, r, s, H) together with a homotopy K :
The following is fairly obvious.
Lemma 3.3. If f has a splitting, then it is pre-idempotent.
Proof. Clearly anything homotopic to a pre-idempotent is pre-idempotent, so it suffices to show that if we have a retraction (A, r, s, H) then s • r is pre-idempotent. In this case, for any x : X, we can define I(x) :≡ ap s (H(r(x))) : s(r(s(r(x)))) = s(r(x)).
We can also show easily that splittings are essentially unique in at least a weak sense.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose f : X → X has two splittings (A, s, r, H, K) and (A , s , r , H , K ). Then A A .
Proof. We have two functions r s : A → A and rs : A → A, and their composites are homotopic to identities: r srs ∼ r f s ∼ r s r s ∼ id A and similarly rs r s ∼ id A .
We expect that a split endofunction is not only pre-idempotent, but fully-coherently idempotent. As remarked in the introduction, it is difficult to define fully-coherent idempotents in type theory, but we can at least define the next step of coherence.
Definition 3.5. A quasi-idempotent is a pre-idempotent (f, I) together with a witness of coherence J : x:X (ap f (I(x)) = I(f (x))).
Lemma 3.6. If f has a splitting, then it is quasi-idempotent.
Proof. As in Lemma 3.3, it suffices to show that for any retraction (A, s, r, H), s • r is quasiidempotent. For this case, in Lemma 3.3 we defined I(x) :≡ ap s (H(r(x))) : s(r(s(r(x)))) = s(r(x)). Thus, for x : X the desired type of J(x) is
This is equivalent to ap s (ap r•s (H(r(x)))) = ap s (H(r(s(r(x))))).
Peeling off an ap s , and letting a :≡ r(x), it will suffice to show that for any a : A we have
At first this seems like a nontrivial property of H. However, in fact it is automatic. For by naturality of the homotopy H applied at the equality H(a), we have
Now we can cancel H(a) from both sides to obtain the desired result.
We now give a few conditions under which pre-idempotents can be split. Our first observation is:
Theorem 3.7. If X is a set, then any pre-idempotent on X has a splitting.
Proof. Define A :≡ x:X (f (x) = x), and let s and r be defined by s(x, p) = x and r(x) = (f (x), I(x)). Now for x : X, we have s(r(x)) ≡ f (x) by definition; hence we can take
. By [Uni13, Theorems 2.7.2 and 2.11.3], to give an element of this type we must give q : f (x) = x and r : ap f (q) −1 I(x) q = p. But we can take q :≡ p, and obtain r from the assumption that X is a set. Now here is our elaboration of Example 1.1, showing that this construction cannot always work.
Example 3.8 (Escardó). Let X be any type and f :≡ id X , with I(x) :≡ refl x . Then with the above-defined A, s, and r, the desired type of H(x, p) is equivalent to q −1 refl x q = p, and hence to refl x = p. If this is true for all x : X and all p : x = x, then X satisfies uip.
Escardó has also observed a couple of other situations in which pre-idempotents can be split. For the first, recall from [KECA14] that a function f : X → Y is weakly constant if we have a witness x,y:X (f (x) = f (y)).
Theorem 3.9 (Escardó). If a pre-idempotent is weakly constant, then it has a splitting.
Proof. We use the same construction as in Theorem 3.7; by following the proof thereof, it remains only to construct H. However, by [KECA14, Lemma 4.1] 1 , when f is weakly constant, our type A :≡ x:X (f (x) = x) (there called fix(f )) is a mere proposition, i.e. we have a,b:A (a = b). This makes the construction of H trivial.
Conversely, it is easy to see that if an endofunction splits through a mere proposition, then it is weakly constant.
For the second, recall from [KECA14] that a type admits a weakly constant endofunction if and only if there is some mere proposition P with functions A → P and P → A (since any function that factors through a mere proposition is weakly constant, while by [KECA14, Lemma 4.1] if f is weakly constant we can take P :≡ fix(f )). Moreover, if we have propositional truncation, this condition is equivalent to the existence of a map A → A, a property which one may call having split support. Finally, recall from [Uni13, Lemma 7.6.2] that a function f : A → B is said to be an embedding if for all b : B the type a:A (f (a) = b) is a mere proposition.
The following theorem is our first example of a definable splitting in which the splitting type A is not the obvious x:X (f (x) = x).
Theorem 3.10 (Escardó). An endofunction f has a splitting in which the section s is an embedding if and only if it is pre-idempotent and the type f (x) = x admits a weakly constant endofunction for all x.
(It is arguably more natural to formulate this theorem in terms of split support. The advantage of using weakly constant endofunctions instead is that it makes sense even in the absence of propositional truncation.)
Proof. First suppose f is pre-idempotent and each f (x) = x has a weakly constant endofunction. Thus, for each x there is a mere proposition P x and maps u x : (f (x) = x) → P x and v x : P x → (f (x) = x). (If we have propositional truncation, we can take P x :≡ f (x) = x , and the reader may find it easier to think about this case.) We define A :
given (x, p) : A where x : X and p : P x , we must show that (f (x), u f (x) (I(x))) = (x, p), which as before amounts to giving q : f (x) = x and an equality q * (u f (x) (I(x))) = p, where q * : P f (x) → P x denotes transport along q. But we can define q :≡ v x (p), while the remaining equality is trivial since P x is a mere proposition. Now conversely, suppose f has a splitting in which s is an embedding; it remains to show that f (x) = x has a weakly constant endofunction for all x : X. Since s is an embedding, the type a:A (s(a) = x) is a mere proposition. Thus, it will suffice to construct maps in both directions relating this type to f (x) = x, or equivalently to the type s(r(x)) = x. In one direction, given p : s(r(x)) = x, we have (r(x), p) : a:A (s(a) = x). In the other, given a : A and p : s(a) = x, we have s(r(x)) = s(r(s(a))) = s(a) = x.
Remarks 3.11.
(1) Theorem 3.7 is a special case of Theorem 3.10: if X is a set, then each type f (x) = x is a mere proposition, hence trivially has a weakly constant endofunction. Moreover, by [KECA14, Theorem 3.10], if every type x = X y has a weakly constant endofunction, then X is necessarily a set. However, there do exist functions on non-sets to which Theorem 3.10 applies; a trivial example is X :≡ Y + 1 with f (x) :≡ inr(tt). (2) On the other hand, there can exist retractions for which the section is not an embedding.
For instance, any map 1 → X exhibits 1 as a retract of X, but to say that all such maps are embeddings is just to say that X is a set. Thus, Theorem 3.10 emphasizes another way in which idempotents in homotopy theory differ from idempotents in set theory, since in set theory the splitting of an idempotent always injects into the original set. (3) When the conditions of Theorem 3.10 fail, it doesn't generally mean there is any particular x : X such that f (x) = x does not have a weakly constant endofunction. It only means we cannot assert that "f (x) = x has a weakly constant endofunction for all x : X", since such an assertion would imply an impossible "naturality" of the endofunctions.
(4) Perhaps surprisingly, none of the results in this section require even function extensionality.
A pre-idempotent that doesn't split
As mentioned in the introduction, it's easy to give examples of idempotence witnesses I : f • f ∼ f that cannot be extended to a coherent system of idempotence data.
Example 4.1. Let X be any type with a point x 0 : X for which there exists a nontrivial p : x 0 = x 0 , i.e. such that p = refl x 0 . (For instance, in the presence of the univalence axiom, we could let X be the universe, with x 0 a type admitting a nonidentity self-equivalence, such as 2.) Define f : X → X by f (x) :≡ x 0 for all x, and let I(x) :≡ p for all x. Then (f, I) is a pre-idempotent. But ap f (q) = refl x 0 for all q, so the second-level coherence type
x:X (ap f (I(x)) = I(f (x))) is equivalent to x:X (refl x 0 = p), which by assumption is not inhabited.
However, it's less clear how to exhibit a pre-idempotent (f, I) for which there cannot exist any other witness I that is coherent. For instance, in the above example, we could simply have taken I (x) :≡ refl x 0 .
We will describe an example inspired by that of [Lur14, Warning 1.2.4.8], but not quite identical to it. In Lurie's example, the space X is the classifying space of the group of endpoint-preserving self-homeomorphisms of the unit interval [0, 1]. However, the essential feature of this choice, for the purposes of the example, is that two such homeomorphisms can be shrunk by a factor of 2 and glued together to form a new such. This is reminiscent of Freyd's universal characterization of [0, 1] (see e.g. [Joh02, D4.7.17]), but in fact it can be completely divorced from the topology. Thus, we will instead use a type familiar to constructive mathematicians: the Cantor space. The essential property of C, for our purposes, is the following. Proof. From left to right, given c : N → 2 we define c (n) :≡ c(n + 1), and split into cases based on whether c(0) is 0 or 1. In the former case, we send c to inl(c ), and in the second case we send it to inr(c ).
From right to left, we send inl(c) to c 0 , where c 0 (0) :≡ 0 and c 0 (n + 1) :≡ c(n); and similarly we send inr(c) to c 1 where c 1 (0) :≡ 1 and c 0 (n + 1) :≡ c(n). It is easy to check that these are inverse equivalences.
We now consider the "classifying space of the automorphism group of C", starting by defining it.
Assumption 4.4. For the rest of this section we assume both univalence and propositional truncation.
From this assumption we also get function extensionality. In fact, as noted earlier, both univalence and propositional truncation separately imply it. 
Our incoherent pre-idempotent will live on the type X :≡ BAut(C), where C is the Cantor space. Thus, we must next construct a particular map f : X → X. If we translated Lurie's construction directly, we would do this by first defining an automorphism F of the group Aut(C), by sending an automorphism h to the automorphism F (h) defined as the composite C C + C h+id − −− → C + C C where the equivalences come from Lemma 4.3. Then we would use the fact that an automorphism of a group induces an automorphism of its classifying space to obtain from F an automorphism of BAut(Y ).
However, although this fact is standard in homotopy theory, it is not obvious from our definition of BAut(Y ) in type theory that any automorphism of the group Aut(Y ) induces an automorphism of the type BAut(Y ). It can be deduced from the alternative construction of classifying spaces in [LF14] ; but fortunately in our case there is a better approach.
The univalence axiom has allowed us to define BAut(Y ) in such a way that its elements literally are types that are merely equivalent to Y (or more precisely, equipped with such a mere equivalence). Thus, we can define f to act directly on such types, rather than indirectly on their automorphisms. Specifically, if we define f (Z) :≡ Z + C, then the induced action on automorphisms will automatically have the intended effect as shown above.
All we have to do is verify that this definition indeed defines an endomorphism of BAut(C), i.e. that if Z = C then also Z + C = C . By the induction principle of propositional truncation, it suffices to prove that if Z = C then Z + C = C, and by univalence it suffices to prove that if e : Z C then Z + C C. But for this we have the composite Z + C C + C C where the first equivalence is e + id and the second is Lemma 4.3.
Next, we have to construct a witness of pre-idempotency for f , i.e. we must show that for any Z : BAut(C) we have (Z + C) + C = Z + C. We again apply univalence and then use the following composite equivalence:
consisting of the associativity of coproducts together with Lemma 4.3. We are now ready for the central theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.6. There exists a pre-idempotent on X :≡ BAut(C) that does not split.
Proof. The construction of the pre-idempotent is as above; it remains to show that f does not split. Lurie's argument is that if it did, then the colimit
− → · · · would be its splitting, and hence the map from X to that colimit would be surjective on fundamental groups; whereas f itself is certainly not surjective on fundamental groups and so this is impossible. In type theory, colimits are difficult to work with, though homotopy type theory with higher inductive types makes them more tractable than otherwise. However, we can fortunately again give a more direct argument, based on our concrete construction of BAut(C).
Suppose for contradiction that f is split. Then by Lemma 3.6 it is quasi-idempotent, with witnesses I and J. For any Z : BAut(C), we have
Since f (f (f (Z))) = Z + C + C + C and f (f (Z)) = Z + C + C, by univalence and function extensionality, J(Z) may equivalently be regarded as a homotopy between two specified equivalences (Z + C + C + C) → (Z + C + C).
The first of these equivalences (corresponding to ap f (I(Z))) decomposes the domain and codomain as (Z +C +C)+C and (Z +C)+C, mapping the first summand Z +C +C to Z +C by I(Z) and the second summand C to C by the identity. As for the second equivalence, if I were the witness (4.1) that we gave above, then the equivalence Z + C + C + C → Z + C + C corresponding to I(f (Z)) would bracket the domain instead as (Z + C) + (C + C) and map it to (Z + C) + C by the identity on Z + C and the "fold" equivalence C + C → C. Thus, the two could not possibly be homotopic, since they would send the third summand of Z + C + C + C to different summands of the codomain.
This argument doesn't quite work as stated, since I might not be the same proof of idempotency that we gave above. (Remember that we are supposing only that f is split, hence quasi-idempotent, in some way, since the claim to prove is that f is not split, which makes no reference to any previously existing witness of pre-idempotence.) However, whatever I is, it is defined "for all Z : BAut(C)". This implies that the induced equivalences Z + C + C → Z + C must be natural with respect to equivalences between Zs (this is not exactly the same sort of naturality that we mentioned in §2, but it follows similarly). In other words, for any Z, Z : BAut(C) and equivalence e : Z Z , the following square must commute (up to homotopy):
In particular, we can take Z and Z to be both f (C), i.e. C + C, and let e be the "flip" automorphism C + C C + C that interchanges the summands. Then the horizontal maps in (4.3) are both the equivalence (C + C) + C + C → (C + C) + C induced by I(f (C)), and (4.3) itself becomes
Consider elements of the third and fourth summands in the upper-left corner, which are fixed by e + id + id on the left. Since the two horizontal maps are both I(f (C)), it must be that the image of any such element under I(f (C)) is fixed by e + id on the right. But the only elements of C + C + C fixed by e + id are those in the third summand. Thus, I(f (C)) must map the last two summands in the domain to the last one summand in the codomain, just as our original witness of pre-idempotency did, so our previous argument to a contradiction kicks in.
Note that we actually showed a bit more: there is a pre-idempotent on BAut(C) that is not even quasi-idempotent. Because univalence and propositional truncation are consistent assumptions, we conclude:
Corollary 4.7. It is impossible to prove in mltt that all pre-idempotents split, or even that all pre-idempotents are quasi-idempotent.
All quasi-idempotents split
We now show, in contrast to Theorem 4.6, that any quasi -idempotent can be split, assuming nothing more than function extensionality. There is an obvious naive thing to try: just as J extends I with an additional coherence, we might try to extend the type x:X (f (x) = x) that worked sometimes in §3 with an additional coherence, defining
However, Kraus has shown that this does not work in general.
Example 5.1 (Kraus) . Let X be a type with an element x 0 : X, and define f : X → X by f (x) :≡ x 0 for all x : X. Then f is quasi-idempotent with I(x) :≡ refl x 0 and J(x) :≡ refl reflx 0 for all x. However, the type of (5.1) in this case becomes
x:X p:x 0 =x (refl x 0 = refl x 0 ). This is equivalent to q: x:X (x 0 =x) (refl x 0 = refl x 0 ) and thence to simply refl x 0 = refl x 0 , since the type x:X (x 0 = x) is contractible.
On the other hand, f has an evident splitting with A :≡ 1, where s picks out the point x 0 . Thus, if (5.1) were also a splitting of it, then by Lemma 3.4 it would be equivalent to 1, i.e. contractible.
However, assuming univalence, there are pointed types (X, x 0 ) for which refl x 0 = refl x 0 is not contractible. For instance, we can take X to be the universe Type, with x 0 :≡ BAut(2). In this case, a nontrivial element of refl x 0 = refl x 0 is constructed in the proof of [Uni13, Theorem 4.1.3] (we will give a slightly different construction of the same element in Remark 8.4). Thus, mltt cannot prove that (5.1) always splits a quasi-idempotent.
Thus thwarted in our naïve attempts, we turn again to ∞-category theory. The proof in [Lur14, Lemma 7.3.5.14] shows that one extra coherence datum suffices to construct a splitting as the colimit of the infinite sequence
As observed before, colimits are difficult to handle in type theory. Fortunately, idempotents are completely self-dual, so we might just as well consider the limit of the infinite sequence
This is easy to define in type theory: it is a:N→X n:N (f (a n+1 ) = a n ). Here we see the need for function extensionality: this type involves functions, and we need to construct equalities in it to exhibit it as a retract of X. For reference, we record exactly how to construct equalities in this type.
Lemma 5.2. Given (a, α) and (b, β) in a:N→X n:N (f (a n+1 ) = a n ), to show that they are equal (assuming function extensionality) it is necessary and sufficent to (1) Construct for each n : N an equality ξ n : a n = b n , and (2) Show that for each n : N the following diagram of equalities commutes: .2) i.e. that α n ξ n = ap f (ξ n+1 ) β n . Proof. Given (f, I, J), define A :≡ a:N→X n:N (f (a n+1 ) = a n ) as above. We define s : A → X by s(a, α) :≡ a 0 , and r : X → A by the slightly less obvious formula r(x) :≡ (λn.f (x), λn.I(x)).
(Note that both components of r(x) are actually constant functions, i.e. independent of n.) Now we obviously have s • r = f ; the tricky part is proving r • s = 1.
Let (a, α) : A, so that a : N → X and α : n:N (f (a n+1 ) = a n ). We must show (a, α) = r(s (a, α) ). By definition, both components of r(s(a, α)) are constant, the first at f (a 0 ) and the second at I(a 0 ); thus we need a family of equalities a n = f (a 0 ) that satisfy commutativity relations. For convenience, we break this down into two steps, by defining an intermediate element (b, β) : A and showing that (b, β) = (a, α) and also (b, β) = r(s (a, α) ). The definition is
To show that (b, β) = (a, α), we apply Lemma 5.2 with ξ n :≡ I(a n+1 ) α n : b n = a n .
We thus have to show that
which (after cancelling α n ) we can do as follows:
Next we have to show that (b, β) = r(s (a, α) ). By definition, r(s(a, α)) ≡ (λn.f (a 0 ), λn.I(a 0 )). Invoking Lemma 5.2 again, we need to firstly construct ξ n : f (f (a n+1 )) = f (a 0 ) for all n. We do this by induction on n. The base case n ≡ 0 is simply ap f (α 0 ) : f (f (a 1 )) = f (a 0 ), while the induction step is the composite
of ap f (α n+1 ) and I(a n+1 ) −1 with the induction hypothesis. It remains to show that ap f •f (α n+1 ) ξ n = ap f (ξ n+1 ) I(a 0 ) for all n, and we do this by induction on n as well. For the base case n ≡ 0, this means to check that
Applying functoriality of ap f on the right, canceling a copy of ap f •f (α 1 ) on both sides, and rearranging a little this becomes
But using J we can make this into
which is an instance of naturality for I. Finally, for the induction step, our inductive hypothesis is that the following diagram commutes:
and our goal is (after applying functoriality of ap f ) to prove that the outer boundary of the following diagram commutes.
The square marked (IH) is just the inductive hypothesis, while what remains can be filled in by naturality and a further application of J.
Remark 5.4. Note that the type A and the section s : A → X involved in the spltting can be defined without knowing either I or J, while the retraction r : X → A and the homotopy K : s • r ∼ f require only I. It is only the other homotopy H : r • s ∼ id A that requires the extra coherence datum J, and likewise only this homotopy that requires function extensionality.
Splitting is a retraction
Assumption 6.1. In this section we assume the univalence axiom.
Recall from the introduction that we can define the types of retractions of X and of quasi-idempotents on X: and Lemma 3.6 defines a map uli : Retr(X) → QIdem(X).
We will now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. split and uli exhibit Retr(X) as a retract of QIdem(X). In other words, split • uli = id Retr(X) .
Before proving this, however, we need to know how to construct equalities in Retr(X).
Lemma 6.3. Suppose given (A, r, s, H) and (A , r , s , H ) in Retr(X). To give an equality (A, r, s, H) = (A , r , s , H ), it suffices to give (1) An equivalence A A , including functions g : A → A and h : A → A and homotopies η : gh ∼ id and : hg ∼ id; (2) A homotopy P : hr ∼ r; (3) A homotopy Q : s g ∼ s; and (4) A witness that ap h (H (g(a) )) a = P (s (g(a) )) ap r (Q(a)) H(a) for all a : A.
Proof. This should be considered a straightforward application of the results of [Uni13, Chapter 2] characterizing identity types of types obtained from different type-formers. Since Retr(X) is a triple Σ-type, by [Uni13, Theorem 2.7.2] we can first decompose equalities in Retr(X) as quadruples of equalities in its constituent types. We then apply univalence to obtain an equivalence A A as the first component, [Uni13, Lemma 2.9.6] to obtain P and Q as the second and third, and similarly for the fourth component. The details are tedious, so we leave them to the reader; like the rest of the paper they have been formalized in Coq.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Suppose given a retraction (A, r : X → A, s : A → X, H : r • s ∼ 1); we want to show that it is equivalent to the splitting of the induced quasi-idempotent sr : X → X. The latter is a new retraction (A , r , s , H ) such that sr = s r (in fact this equality holds judgmentally). By Lemma 3.4, we have an equivalence A A composed of g = r s : A → A and h = rs : A → A, with η : gh ≡ r srs = r s r s = id and dually : hg ≡ rs r s = rsrs = id. Moreover, we have P : hr ≡ rs r = rsr = r and Q : s g ≡ s r s = srs = s; thus it remains to construct the fourth datum in Lemma 6.3.
In general, both sides of this equality are homotopies rs r s r s ∼ 1. Note that in our case, the domain rs r s r s is judgmentally equal to rsrsrs. Substituting the definitions of r , s , and H from Theorem 5.3, we see that the left-hand side of the desired equality is the composite Now by naturality, we have ap rs (H(rsrsa)) ap rs (H(rsa)) = ap rsrs (H(rsa)) ap rs (H(rsa)).
Applying this in the middle of (6.1), and canceling ap rsrs (H(rsa)) with its inverse on the left, we reduce it to Comparing this to (6.2), we can cancel H(rsrsa) on the left, reducing the problem to ap rs (Ha) Ha = H(rsa) Ha, which is another naturality.
Theorem 6.2 makes no reference to a specified function f , but we can deduce from it a statement that does. Given an endofunction f , we define a splitting of f to be a retraction (A, r, s, H) : Retr(X) together with a homotopy K : s • r ∼ f . These form a type Split(X, f ) :≡ (A,r,s,H):Retr(X) (s • r ∼ f ). We also have a type QIdem(X, f ) :≡
x:X (ap f (I(x)) = I(f (x))) of "quasi-idempotence data for f ". Corollary 6.4. For any f : X → X, the type Split(X, f ) is a retract of QIdem(X, f ).
Proof. Let k : Retr(X) → (X → X) take (A, r, s, H) to the composite sr. Then Split(X, f ) is, by definition, the fiber of k over f . On the other hand, by [Uni13, Lemma 4.8.1], the type QIdem(X, f ) is equivalent to the fiber over f of the first projection QIdem(X) → (X → X). The retraction from Theorem 6.2 commutes with these maps to X → X; hence by [Uni13, Lemma 4.7.3], it induces a retraction between their fibers.
Similarly, we can consider the case when f is already equipped with a witness I of pre-idempotency. We define Split(X, f, I) to be (A,r,s,H,K):Split(X,f )
, the long composite being just the result of transferring the definition of Lemma 3.3 across the homotopy K : sr ∼ f . And of course we have the type QIdem(X, f, I) :≡ x:X (ap f (I(x)) = I(f (x))) of quasi-idempotence enhancements of I.
Corollary 6.5. For any (f, I), the type Split(X, f, I) is a retract of QIdem(X, f, I).
Proof. As in Corollary 6.4, we take fibers of two maps to the type f • f ∼ f of I. We leave the details to the reader; or they can be found in the formalization.
Splitting is not an equivalence
We now consider what can be said about the composite uli • split, which is an endofunction of QIdem(X). Our first observation is that it preserves the witness I of pre-idempotence.
Theorem 7.1. Assume function extensionality. Then given a quasi-idempotent (f, I, J), if we split it as in Theorem 5.3, the witness of pre-idempotence induced from the splitting as in Lemma 3.3 is equal to I.
Proof. Given a retraction s : A → X and r : X → A with H : r • s ∼ 1, the induced I was defined in Lemma 3.3 by I(x) :≡ ap s (H(r(x))). For the splitting from Theorem 5.3 with A :≡ a:N→X x:X (f (a n+1 ) = a n ), we have s(a, b) :≡ a 0 , so the induced I (x) is just the 0-component of the homotopy H : r • s ∼ 1 at r(x) :≡ (λn.f (x), λn.I(x)). By construction, this is the composite
where I is the given witness of pre-idempotence. But by the given J, we have ap f (I(x)) = I(f (x)), so this reduces to just I(x).
Thus, if the further coherence witness J were also recovered from the splitting, we would have uli • split = id, and hence (assuming univalence, so that the results of the previous section apply) split and uli would be inverse equivalences between Retr(X) and QIdem(X). By Corollary 6.4 and Corollary 6.5, this would also yield equivalences between Split(X, f ) and QIdem(X, f ), and between Split(X, f, I) and QIdem(X, f, I), for any f and I. We will show that this is impossible in general, beginning with the following observation.
Lemma 7.2. Assuming univalence, if f :≡ id X and I(x) :≡ refl x for all x, then the type Split(X, f, I) is contractible.
Proof. Recall that for any type B and point b 0 : B, the type b:B (b = b 0 ) is contractible. By univalence, it follows that for any type X, the type A:Type (A X) is contractible. Since Split(X, f, I) begins with a A:Type , it will suffice to show that the rest of it is equivalent to (A X).
We will use the "half-adjoint equivalence" definition of (A X) from [Uni13, §4.2]. The data r and s are, of course, maps back and forth, while since f ≡ id X the data H and K have the right types to be the homotopies and η. It remains, therefore, to show that the type of the remaining datum:
is equivalent to a:A (ap s (H(a)) = K(s(a))). Now since f ≡ id X and I(x) ≡ refl x , we can discard the ap f , move the K(x) −1 to the other side, and then cancel it. If we move K(s(r(x))) to the other side as well, we obtain x:X (ap s (H(r(x))) = K(s(r(x)))). Finally, since s, H, and K suffice to show that r is an equivalence, we can transport along it to obtain the desired type a:A (ap s (H(a)) = K(s(a))).
Therefore, if we had uli•split = id, then QIdem(X, id X , λx.refl x ) would also be contractible for any X. However, QIdem(X, id X , λx.refl x ) reduces to x:X (refl x = refl x ), which we might call the 2-center of X (see §8 for why). Thus, it suffices to construct a type X whose 2-center has nontrivial inhabitants. Of course, such an X cannot be a set or even a 1-type, but it will suffice for it to be a 2-type (i.e. its twice-iterated equality types p = (x= X y) q are sets). Remark 7.3. As pointed out by a referee, there are many ways to construct such a 2-type using higher inductive types. For instance, if X is the 2-truncation of the 2-sphere, we can define an element of x:X (refl x = refl x ) by truncation-induction (since refl x = refl x is a 0-type) followed by sphere-induction, sending the basepoint to the generating 2-loop and the rest being trivial for truncation reasons. More generally, we could take X to be an Eilenberg-Mac Lane space K(G, 2) for any nontrivial abelian group G (see [LF14] ) -the 2-truncation of the 2-sphere is a K(Z, 2). However, if we are willing to work a little harder,
we can obtain such a 2-type using only univalence and propositional truncation: just as BAut(2) supports a nontrivial element of the 1-center x:X (x = x), to find a nontrivial element of the 2-center we can use X :≡ BAut(BAut(2)).
Theorem 7.4. Assuming univalence and propositional truncation, if X :≡ BAut(BAut(2)), then x:X (refl x = refl x ) has a nontrivial element.
Idea of proof. As an ∞-groupoid, BAut(2) has one object with two automorphisms, the identity and the flip. Since automorphisms preserve identities, BAut(2) itself has only one automorphism, but there are two self-homotopies of that automorphism. In other words, the space of automorphisms of BAut(2) is equivalent to BAut(2) itself. Thus, BAut(BAut(2)) has one object, with only its identity morphism, but two 2-morphisms from that identity to itself. This nonidentity 2-morphism is essentially our desired nontrivial element.
However, proving this carefully in type theory requires a lot of lemmas about classifying spaces, so we defer it to the next section. (An alternative proof can be found in [Kra15, Lemma 7.5.2].) Corollary 7.5. In mltt with function extensionality (which is necessary to construct the function split), it is impossible to prove that uli • split = id QIdem(X) for every type X.
The double classifying space of 2
Here we will prove Theorem 7.4. For this we need some preliminary lemmas about types of the form BAut(X).
Assumption 8.1. Throughout this section we assume both univalence and propositional truncation.
Our first lemma says that defining a section of a family of sets indexed by BAut(X) is equivalent to giving an element lying over X itself which is fixed by all automorphisms of X. To make sense of "fixed by", we use the notion of transport: given any type family B : A → Type, if p : x = A y we have a function p * : B(x) → B(y) defined by identity-type elimination (see [Uni13, Chapter 2] for more information).
For convenience, we will frequently implicitly coerce elements of BAut(X) to their underlying types.
Lemma 8.2. Let X be any type, and suppose P : BAut(X) → Type is a family of sets. Then p:X=X (f (X, p) = f (X, refl X )). The same property implies that Z:Type (Z = X) → P (Z) is equivalent to P (X), where the inverse equivalence sends e : P (X) to λZ.λq.q * (e). Transferring across this equivalence, we obtain the desired result.
We can use this to characterize types of the form Z:BAut(X) (Z = Z), which are "one level down" from the type Z:BAut(X) (refl Z = refl Z ) considered in Theorem 7.4. Lemma 8.3 says that Z:BAut(X) (Z = Z) is equivalent to the type of automorphisms of X that commute with all other automorphisms of X, i.e. the center of Aut(X). This explains why when we move up a level to the type appearing in Theorem 7.4, we may reasonably call it the 2-center.
Lemma 8.5. If X is a 1-type, then Z:BAut(X) (refl Z = refl Z ) is equivalent to f : x:X (x=x) g:X X
x:X (ap g (f (x)) = f (g(x))). Proof. Since X is a 1-type, (refl Z = refl Z ) is a set for any Z : BAut(X). Thus, by Lemma 8.2, Z:BAut(X) (refl Z = refl Z ) is equivalent to e:refl X =refl X g:X=X g * (e) = e. Now by univalence and function extensionality, refl X = refl X is equivalent to x:X (x = x), while of course X = X is equivalent to X X. Under this equivalence, g * (e) is identified with λx.ap g (f (g −1 (x))). Finally, since g is an equivalence, we can transfer it to the other side of the equation and obtain the desired result.
We want to apply Lemma 8.5 to X :≡ BAut (2) . In that case, we have a nontrivial f : x:BAut(2) (x = x) from Remark 8.4. Therefore, to prove Theorem 7.4 it remains to show that this f satisfies ap g (f (Z)) = f (g(Z)) for all automorphisms g of BAut(2) and all Z : BAut(2).
Of course, this requires knowing something about all automorphisms of BAut(2). In our proof sketch of Theorem 7.4, we claimed that the space of automorphisms of BAut(2) should be equivalent to BAut(2) itself, but our argument involved decomposing an ∞-groupoid into "objects, morphisms, and 2-morphisms" which is not possible in homotopy type theory. Instead, we need to give a more "synthetic" argument, analogous to our construction of the incoherent pre-idempotent on BAut(C) in §4.
The idea is as follows: since 2 is an abelian group (the cyclic group of order 2), BAut(2) should also be an abelian ∞-group. Since multiplication by a fixed element of an ∞-group is an equivalence, this will give us a map BAut(2) → (BAut(2) BAut(2)), which we can then show to be an equivalence.
Now we have to define the group operation on BAut(2) internally. The idea to keep in mind is that the elements of BAut(2) are the "finite sets with two elements". They are merely isomorphic to 2, but to specify such an isomorphism 2 Z is the same as specifying an element of Z (to be the image of 1 : 2).
The "morally-best" definition of the group operation would perhaps be as a "tensor product over the field with two elements". However, since we are not assuming any colimits, we use instead the following: Z * W :≡ (Z W ). Since 2 (2 2), it follows that Z W is in BAut(2) if Z and W are.
This definition is obviously symmetric, Z * W = W * Z. Moreover, it has 2 itself as a left (hence also right) identity: if W : BAut(2) then an equivalence e : 2 W is uniquely determined by e(1) : W . And Z * Z is equivalent to 2 for any Z, since it has a canonically specified element (namely the identity); thus in particular * has inverses. The trickiest part is showing associativity.
